Operational guidance, not legal advice. This page distills named public sources (regulator guidance and industry practice). It is not a legal determination, not a notification decision, and not a substitute for your counsel, insurer, or a retained DFIR firm. Verify applicability and current deadlines for your facts and jurisdiction.
How does ShipReadyMetrics prioritize vulnerability risk?
Updated
ShipReadyMetrics ranks open findings by a fixed order: actively exploited (CISA KEV) first, then most overdue, then severity, then exploitation probability (FIRST EPSS), enriched with CVSS. It does not patch anything, does not determine legal applicability, and does not prove absence of risk. Not legal advice.
This page describes the shipped product's own method, last verified 10 September 2026. It cites FIRST EPSS, the CISA KEV catalog, FIRST CVSS, and MITRE CVE as the third-party signals the method consumes. It is not legal advice, not a determination that any framework applies to YOU, and not a claim that any finding list is exhaustive.
This explains a method, not a guarantee
Audience: a prospective buyer, a current user, or an engineer who wants to see exactly how findings get ordered before trusting the order. This is the one page in this cluster that is intentionally about this product rather than vendor-neutral practice — every other page in this cluster stays neutral. It is not legal advice, does not determine that any legal or framework obligation applies to YOU, and does not prove that any specific system has no unaddressed risk.
The point of this page is falsifiability: every claim below names the actual signal, the actual source, and what that signal does not tell you, so the method can be checked rather than taken on faith. Last verified 10 September 2026.
Nothing on this page is a promise about a future capability. It describes what the shipped method does today, and it says plainly where that method stops.
Inputs — what the ranking actually uses
The table below lists each input to the ranking and the vendor-neutral explainer on this site that describes it without any product framing. Read the explainer to understand the underlying concept; read this section to understand how this product specifically uses it. Last verified 10 September 2026. Not legal advice.
| Input | What it is | Neutral explainer on this site |
|---|---|---|
| Multi-source finding ingest | Findings ingested from connected sources: GitHub Dependabot, GitHub CodeQL code scanning, GitHub Secret Scanning, first-party ShipReady SAST, first-party ShipReady DAST, GitLab, Azure DevOps, and cloud CSPM connectors (AWS Security Hub, Google Cloud SCC, Azure Defender, Oracle Cloud Guard) when those sources are connected. | The how-to-detect-vulnerable-open-source-packages guide on this site covers the SCA side of this ingest. |
| Cross-source dedup | The same advisory reported by more than one connected source is collapsed to one finding, so a distinct CVE is not counted once per repository and once per scanner. | The how-to-detect-vulnerable-open-source-packages guide on this site discusses direct vs. transitive identity, which is the basis for dedup. |
| CVE identity and CVSS severity | Each finding is associated with a CVE identifier where one exists, and enriched with a CVSS base score where MITRE and FIRST publish one. | The CVE-vs-CWE-vs-CVSS guide on this site explains what CVSS does and does not measure. |
| CISA KEV enrichment | A finding whose CVE appears on the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog is flagged as actively exploited and ranked ahead of severity alone. | The what-is-KEV guide on this site explains what qualifies a CVE for that catalog and who it legally binds. |
| FIRST EPSS enrichment | Each finding's highest EPSS score across its CVEs is shown as the published probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST's own model. | The exploitability-vs-severity guide on this site explains what an EPSS score does and does not tell you. |
| Blast radius (npm lockfiles only) | A separate lookup — which repositories declare or install a named package — resolved transitively from npm lockfiles when the GitHub scan fetched them. Yarn, pnpm, NuGet, and PyPI dependencies, and any npm repository without a readable lockfile, remain what the manifest declares. | The what-is-an-SBOM guide on this site covers what an SBOM-style inventory is and how it differs from a live scan. |
| Aging against a due date | Each finding's days past its severity-based remediation deadline, computed from its own first-seen date rather than assumed. | The how-to-prioritize-vulnerabilities guide on this site discusses why an overdue deadline is a comparable signal across finding types. |
| Undatable-finding disclosure | A finding whose first-seen date could not be read is shown as undatable rather than silently treated as inside its deadline. | The vulnerability remediation SLAs guide on this site discusses why an unmeasured finding is not the same as a compliant one. |
How the inputs combine — the actual tie-break order
The open-findings queue is not one blended score; it is a deterministic tie-break, evaluated in this order: (1) whether the finding is actively exploited per CISA KEV, descending; (2) how many days it is past its own remediation deadline, descending; (3) severity rank, most severe first; (4) the finding's highest published EPSS score, descending; (5) oldest first-seen date, then a stable identifier, as the final tiebreak. Each finding also shows the specific reasons behind its position — the fact and the source — rather than an opaque number. Last verified 10 September 2026. Not legal advice.
Exploitation outranks severity by design: a moderate-severity finding under confirmed active exploitation is treated as a worse problem than a high-severity finding nobody is known to be exploiting. An overdue deadline the organization itself set outranks a fresh severity label for the same reason — it is a stronger, more comparable claim on attention than a scanner's assigned severity, and every incident review tends to agree with that ordering after the fact.
- A finding with no readable first-seen date is shown as undatable, not silently treated as fresh or excluded — an unmeasured finding is not the same as a zero.
- A finding with no CVE identifier gets no EPSS or KEV line at all, rather than a hedged or assumed one.
- The queue is reproducible: given the same finding data and the same date, the order does not vary.
- Ties that survive every stated tiebreak fall back to a stable identifier, so the order is always fully determined rather than arbitrary at the margin.
What this method does not claim
The list below states the boundaries of the method as plainly as the method itself. None of these are footnotes; each one changes how a result here should be read. Last verified 10 September 2026. Not legal advice.
- It does not patch anything. Ranking a finding does not fix it; a named human still applies, verifies, and closes every remediation.
- It does not determine legal applicability. Flagging a finding, or noting that KEV or a framework control might touch it, is not a determination that any statute, directive, or certified control binds YOU.
- It does not prove the absence of risk. A clean queue reflects only what was ingested from connected sources and successfully matched to a CVE; it is not a claim that no other risk exists.
- EPSS is a probability, not a verdict. A high EPSS score means the model estimates a higher likelihood of exploitation across similar vulnerabilities in a population — it is not a statement that YOUR specific instance will be exploited.
- KEV absence is not safety. The KEV catalog is a lagging indicator: a vulnerability under active exploitation right now may not be listed yet. A finding not flagged as KEV-exploited has not been cleared; it has simply not (yet) been confirmed.
- Blast radius is scoped to npm lockfiles that were actually fetched. Yarn, pnpm, NuGet, PyPI, and npm repositories without a readable lockfile are reported from what the manifest declares, not from a resolved transitive tree — a package pulled in only transitively through one of those paths may not appear.
- It does not know reachability. The method ranks by exploitation evidence and probability, not by whether the vulnerable code path is actually called in YOUR deployment.
How to check this yourself
This page is written so the method can be checked, not just trusted. The table below points at the specific fact to look for on a given finding, and what it would mean if that fact were missing or wrong. Last verified 10 September 2026. Not legal advice.
| Claim | What to look for on a finding | What its absence would mean |
|---|---|---|
| Exploitation outranks severity. | A lower-severity, KEV-flagged finding sitting above a higher-severity finding with no KEV flag in the same queue. | If severity alone determined order, this page's description of the method would be wrong. |
| Every finding shows its own reasons, not just a score. | A finding detail listing the specific facts behind its position — exploited status, overdue days, severity, EPSS — not an opaque number. | An opaque ranking with no stated reasons would not match the method described here. |
| Blast radius is scoped to npm lockfiles that were fetched. | A blast-radius result for a Yarn, pnpm, NuGet, or PyPI project reported as 'declared' rather than a resolved transitive verdict. | A transitive verdict for one of those other ecosystems would contradict the scope stated here. |
What to do now
The list below is how to use this method responsibly, not a claim that using it discharges any legal or framework obligation. Last verified 10 September 2026. Not legal advice.
- Treat the queue order as a strong default, not a final answer — a person with deployment knowledge is allowed to override it, and the override should be recorded.
- Check the inputs table above against what your organization has actually connected before assuming a low finding count reflects a genuinely low-risk estate.
- Read each finding's stated reasons, not just its position, before deciding whether to act.
- For a package-level exposure question, check whether the answer came from a resolved npm lockfile or a declared manifest before treating a 'not found' result as reassurance.
- Pair this product's ranking with your own asset-exposure knowledge; the method has no visibility into whether a given code path is actually reachable in YOUR deployment.
- Do not cite this product's ranking as a legal determination that any framework, directive, or statute has been satisfied.
- Connect the sources relevant to your estate before drawing conclusions from an empty or short queue; an unconnected source contributes nothing to the ranking.
Where this shows up in ShipReady Metrics
If you already have a session: signed-in app → Security → Findings is the continuous operating layer this page describes — the queue is recomputed as findings are ingested, enriched, and updated, not generated once and frozen. It is not a complete enterprise-wide asset inventory, it does not apply patches to YOUR estate, and it does not file with CISA, ENISA, or any market-surveillance authority.
This page describes the method the shipped product actually runs, not a roadmap or an aspiration. Any capability not described above is not part of this method. This page does not document a public demo URL.
Primary sources (last verified 10 September 2026)
Every third-party signal claim on this page is taken from one of these; the method description itself is drawn from the shipped product, not from marketing material.
FIRST's Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) publishes a daily exploitation-probability score for CVEs — a model output, not a verdict. The CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog lists CVEs with reliable evidence of active exploitation — a lagging indicator, not a complete list of what is currently exploited. FIRST's Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) rates a vulnerability's intrinsic severity, not its likelihood of exploitation. MITRE's CVE program assigns the identifiers this method uses to correlate findings across sources. These are not a complete world list. Not legal advice.
The CVE-vs-CWE-vs-CVSS, what-is-KEV, how-to-prioritize-vulnerabilities, exploitability-vs-severity, what-is-an-SBOM, and how-to-detect-vulnerable-open-source-packages guides on this site are the neutral explainers this page's inputs map to. The vulnerability-management glossary entry on this site is the education page under glossary. This page describes the vulnerability-management ranking specifically; it does not describe how any other part of the product scores unrelated categories such as code quality or delivery metrics.
Frequently asked questions
Is this legal advice?
No. It is a description of this product's own ranking method, citing FIRST EPSS, the CISA KEV catalog, FIRST CVSS, and MITRE CVE for the third-party signals it consumes. It does not determine that any statute, directive, or certified control applies to YOU. This page is not legal advice.
Does ShipReadyMetrics patch vulnerabilities for us?
No. The product ranks and enriches findings from connected sources; it does not apply patches, upgrade dependencies, or change configuration on YOUR behalf. A named human still applies, verifies, and closes every remediation.
Does a clean queue mean we have no vulnerabilities?
No. The queue reflects only what was ingested from connected sources and successfully matched to a CVE. It is not proof that no other risk exists, and it is not a substitute for confirming which sources are actually connected and which repositories they actually cover.
If a finding isn't flagged as KEV-exploited, is it safe to deprioritize?
Not necessarily. The CISA KEV catalog is a lagging indicator — a CVE is added once exploitation has been observed and confirmed, so something under active exploitation right now may not be listed yet. A finding without the KEV flag has not been cleared; it simply has not been confirmed as actively exploited yet.
Does the blast-radius view cover every dependency ecosystem?
No. It is scoped to npm lockfiles (package-lock.json, npm-shrinkwrap.json) resolved transitively when the GitHub scan fetched them. Yarn, pnpm, NuGet, and PyPI dependencies, and any npm repository without a readable lockfile, are reported from what the manifest declares rather than from a resolved transitive tree, so a package pulled in only transitively through one of those other paths may not appear.
Is the ranking a single risk score?
No. It is a deterministic tie-break evaluated in a fixed order — exploited status, then overdue days, then severity, then EPSS, then age — not one blended number. Each finding shows the specific facts behind its position so the order can be checked rather than trusted as an opaque score.
Does the method claim to be complete or exhaustive?
No. It ranks whatever was ingested from the sources that are actually connected for a given organization. A source that was never connected contributes nothing to the queue, and this page does not claim the resulting list represents every risk that exists — only the risk visible to the connected sources.
Can we override the ranking?
The ranking order is a fixed, described tie-break, not an editable weighting in this product. A person with deployment knowledge can act out of order for a specific finding — for example, deferring one the queue puts high because it is not reachable — but that is a human decision applied on top of the queue, not a change to the method itself.
Published by ShipReady Metrics, an evidence-based technology and compliance intelligence platform. This guide is educational and vendor-neutral.